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PUBLIC SCHOOL GRADUATION PRAYER
INTRODUCTION
Once when the wind was whipping the banner of a
temple, the Sixth Patriarch of Zen witnessed two
monks debating about it. One said the banner was
moving, one said the wind was moving.
They argued back and forth without attaining the
principle, so the Patriarch said, "This is not the move-
ment of the wind, nor the movement of the banner; it is
the movement of your minds."
The two monks were both awestruck.1
Americans hotly contest the constitutionality of prayer in
public school commencement ceremonies.2 In its only gradua-
tion prayer case,' the Supreme Court held that a rabbi's offer-
ing of a school administration-organized4 prayer violated the
First Amendment. The following summer, however, the Court
denied certiorari on a Fifth Circuit case, leaving intact student-
1 HUI-K'AI, NOT THE WIND, NOT THE BANNER, No BARRIER: UNLOCKING
THE ZEN KOAN 141 (Thomas Cleary trans. & comm., 1993).
2 See, e.g., Michele A. Parish, Graduation Prayer Violates the Bill of Rights,
4 UTAH BAR J. 19 (June/July 1991), cited in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,
2666 n.10 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring):
Of all the issues the ACLU takes on - reproductive rights, discrim-
ination, jail and prison conditions, abuse of kids in the public
schools, police brutality, to name a few - by far the most volatile
issue is that of school prayer. Aside from our efforts to abolish the
death penalty, it is the only issue that elicits death threats.
See also Mark O'Keefe, Holy Warriors: The American Center for Law and
Justice Crusades for the Christian Right in Court, STUDENT LAW., Dec. 1993,
at 12:
Most of the time, the ACLU and ACLJ are at odds over what the
First Amendment means when it says government "shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." In the graduation prayer case, for example, the
two sides clashed like legal warriors in hand-to-hand combat.
3 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2649.
" For convenience and at the risk of reinforcing what this paper will show
to be a non-distinction, this Note will differentiate school administration-orga-
nized from student-directed public school graduation prayers.
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initiated, student-led prayer at a public high school commence-
ment.5 Last November, the Ninth Circuit6 held precisely the
opposite of the Fifth Circuit and created a split in the circuits
regarding student-directed prayer. Judging by the number of
' Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993) [hereinafter Jones Ill. Although the denial of
certiorari "carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's views
on the merits of a case which it has declined to review," Maryland v. Balti-
more Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950), clearly some graduation prayers
are currently legal in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. See Ingebretsen v.
Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473, 1492 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (enjoining
the "enforcement of the Mississippi School-Prayer Statute, 1994 MISS. LAWS
ch. 609, §§ 1 to 3 (codified as amended at MIss.CoDE ANN. §§ 37-13-4 & 37-13-
4.1 (rev. 1990)) ... except as to nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-
initiated voluntary prayer at high school commencement, as condoned by
Jones H.")
6 Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 1994 WL 651111 (9th Cir.
1994).
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public school graduation prayer suits filed to date,' the Su-
preme Court likely will face this issue again.
7 See id. (finding student-directed public school commencement prayers
unconstitutional); Friedman v. Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., 955 F.2d 802
(8th Cir. 1993) (finding taxpayers lacked standing to enjoin graduation
prayer); Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992) (remanding case
contesting the offering of a prayer by the president of the school board at a
public school graduation ceremony); Jones 11, 977 F.2d at 963 (finding student-
directed prayers constitutional); Stein v. Plainwell Community Schs., 822 F.2d
1406 (6th Cir. 1987) (analogizing the prayers to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983), and finding them unconstitutional under the Marsh test); Florey
v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
987 (1980) (permitting continuance of tradition of invocation and benediction
in commencement ceremonies); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp.
446 (M.D. Fl.), appeal filed, No. 93-833 Civ-J-10 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding
constitutional a student-directed prayer); Oldham v. ACLU, 849 F. Supp. 611
(M.D. Tenn. 1994) (finding principal had no standing to seek declaratory relief
against threat to litigate if school district permitted graduation prayers);
Ingebretsen, 864 F. Supp. at 1473 (finding nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
student-initiated voluntary prayer condoned by Jones 11); Gearon v. Loudoun
County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding unconstitutional
the offering of prayer at a high school graduation ceremony regardless of who
made the decision to offer it); Griffith v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054 (holding
that nonsectarian and nonproselytizing prayers did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause) (ruled erroneous in Griffith v. Teran, 807 F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan.
1992); Albright v. Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682 (D.
Utah 1991) (refusing to grant injunction for students seeking to enjoin the
offering of invocations and benedictions); Lundberg v. West Monona Communi-
ty Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa 1989) (ruling that minister saying
prayers at high school graduation ceremony would violate the Establishment
Clause); Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(finding recitation of a prayer at graduation ceremonies violated the Establish-
ment Clause); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531
(S.D. Iowa 1985) (ruling graduation prayer unconstitutional); Grossberg v.
Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974) (denying preliminary injunction
banning prayer at graduation); Wood v. Mount Lebanon Township Sch. Dist.,
342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (upholding prayer in graduation ceremony);
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1993) (finding
no subject matter jurisdiction in case contesting appropriation of state funds
to support petition in Lee); Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d. 809
(Cal. 1991) (striking down a graduation prayer under the Lemon test articulat-
ed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)); Bennett v. Livermore
Unified Sch. Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987) (striking down graduation
ceremony prayer under all three prongs of the Lemon test); Kay v. David
Douglas Sch. Dist., 719 P.2d 875 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (same), rev'd on other
grounds, 738 P.2d 1389 (Or.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1032 (1987); Wiest v.
Mount Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (Pa.) (finding public school
commencement prayers constitutional), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
336 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:333
A public school that permits or requires a graduation prayer
violates the Establishment Clause if those in attendance per-
ceive the school is endorsing religion.' In order to determine if
endorsement occurs, the Court must take into account the
participants' perceptive capacities.9 However, offhand assump-
tions as to the impact on students of school-endorsed religious
activity are inadequate; just as the monks must see through
their preconceptions to ascertain accurately the nature of
whatever situations they face,"° so must the Justices look
8 Justice O'Connor introduced the endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Grand Rapids Sch.
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985), the court noted that "an important
concern of the effects test is whether the challenged governmental action is
sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denomi-
nations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their
individual religious choices." This test was adopted by a majority of the Court
in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) ("Thus, by prohibit-
ing government endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits
precisely what occurred here: the government's lending its support to the
communication of a . . . religious message.") Justice O'Connor specifically
recommends use of the endorsement test in cases involving religion in public
schools. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114
S. Ct. 2481, 2499-500 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally Arnold
H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the
Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight,
64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986) (supporting the endorsement/disapproval test).
But see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal Illusions: Estab-
lishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement' Test, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 266
(1987), for a critique of the this approach.
9 See Lawrence F. Rossow & Nancy D. Rossow, Student Initiated Religious
Activity: Constitutional Argument or Psychological Inquiry, 19 J.L. & EDUC.
207 (1990) (supporting use of social scientific research to assist in ascertaining
students' capacities to perceive religious neutrality); Note, The Constitutional
Dimensions of Student-Oriented Religious Activity in Public High Schools
[hereinafter Constitutional Dimensions], 92 YALE L.J. 499 (1983) (applying
studies from adolescent psychology to extracurricular student religious
meetings); Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional
Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1983) (promoting a perception-oriented
approach to determining constitutionality of school-sponsored religious
activities in public schools). But see Christian M. Keiner, A Critical Analysis
of Continuing Establishment Clause Flux as Illustrated By Lee v. Weisman,
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) and Graduation Prayer Case Law: Can Mutual
Tolerance Reconcile Dynamic Principles of Religious Diversity and Human
Commonality, 24 PAC. L.J. 401, 453-55 (1993) (questioning use of social science
approach due to "elasticity" of results).
10 As one interpreter summed up this Note's opening quotation:
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beyond their unsupported assumptions as to how individuals
perceive graduation prayers in order to reach decisions informed
by the facts that confront them."
Part I of this Note sets forth the main tests used by the
courts in Establishment Clause cases and traces the key school
prayer cases in order to illuminate the Court's unsupported
assumptions about students' impressionabilities. Part II dis-
cusses social perspective-taking, a theory of developmental
psychology that provides insight into how individuals perceive
complex social phenomena, and applies its findings to the public
school commencement prayer context. Part III concludes that
even if a prayer were offered under optimal conditions,' the
great majority of public school graduation attendees would per-
ceive that the school endorses the offered prayer. Because of
these perceptions, offering prayers in this setting would violate
the Establishment Clause.
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
This section begins with an overview of the test articulated
by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman" and addresses
the current state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part
B of this section discusses the Court's holdings in particular
public school prayer cases and notes that the Court's solicitude
for the impact of religious activity on students is tied to its
assumptions concerning students' age-related
The essential point of the story is to illustrate how we think about
our thoughts and imagine we have thereby explained things.
Judging by our conceptual constructions rather than by direct
perceptions, we may wind up entrapped in our own points of view.
We may think we are talking about realities when all we are doing
is talking' about what we think. As the koan says, this can be a
shocking realization.
HUI-K'AI, supra note 1, at 142.
" See Thomas A. Schweitzer, Lee v. Weisman and the Establishment
Clause: Are Invocations and Benedictions at Public School Graduations
Constitutionally Unspeakable?, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 113, 169-70 (noting
failure to ascertain understanding of graduation ceremony audience entails
the drawback of separating 'judicial fact-facting from external reality and
turns fact-finding into a solitary judicial exercise with no empirical compo-
nent.)
' For example, a disclaimer by the school of its support. For a discussion
of optimal circumstances, see infra part II.B.
13 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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impressionabilities. Part C of this section provides summaries
of the three most recent and prominent commencement prayer
cases and suggests the Court make a more informed consider-
ation of the perceptions of those who come in contact with public
school graduation prayers.
A. THE STANDARD IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court articulated a
three-pronged test for evaluating the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania law that provided for state funds to subsidize
private schools.' 4 The Lemon Court decided that to be consti-
tutional a law "must have a secular legislative purpose"; that
"its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advanc-
es nor inhibits religion"; and that it "must not foster 'an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.""' 5 If a State law
or activity fails to meet any of the three prongs, it violates the
Establishment Clause.
16
The Court narrowly construes the first prong, or "purpose"
test, to invalidate only -those laws based exclusively or almost
exclusively on a religious purpose. 7 As members of the Court
have recognized that prayer could serve "the legitimate secular
purpose of solemnizing public occasions, '"18 a majority might
14 Id. at 612-13.
1 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).'
16 
Id.
17 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). See also Allan Gordus, Case Note, The Establishment Clause and
Prayers in Public High School Graduations: Jones v. Clear Creek Indepen-
dent School District, 47 ARK. L. REv. 653, 665-66 n.76 (1994); Gary J. Simson,
The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's
Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 909 (1987).
8 Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 n.46 (1989) ("[It] is a form
of acknowledgment of religion that 'serve[s], in the only wa[y] reasonably
possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public
occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition
of what is worthy of appreciation in society."') (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The Fifth Circuit adopted
this analysis in applying the first prong of the Lemon test to graduation
prayer. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993) ("The Lee Court stated that the Providence
school district's solemnization argument would have 'considerable force were
it not for the constitutional constraints applied to state action....' The Court
did not question its members' previous acknowledgements that solemnization
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conclude that prayer at school graduation serves such a solem-
nizing purpose.' 9 Even if the solemnizing purpose were not
explicitly set forth, the court might infer such a purpose from
the ceremonial nature of the occasion. Upon finding a solemniz-
ing purpose, the Court would rule that the purpose was permis-
sible and that the activity passed the first prong of the Lemon
test.
State action fails the second prong's "effect" test if it has
"the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion."2 Just
as the Court would apply the endorsement test to the first
prong,2' it also added endorsement analysis to Lemon's second
prong," possibly to the extent of supplanting the second
prong.' The effect prong, as updated by the endorsement test,
is a legitimate secular purpose of ceremonial prayer." (quoting Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660 (1992) (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 595 n.46 (1989))); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (depicting
"solemnization" as the "secular purpose" behind legislative prayer); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962). But see Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No.
241, 1994 WL 651111, *11 (9th Cir.) (finding "solemnization [through prayer]
is insufficient... to secularize what is objectively and inherently religious.");
Lee v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090, 1095 n.13 (1st Cir. 1990), affd 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992) ("I am surprised that religious groups would support an argument that
explicitly relegates the value of religion in our society to the merely ceremoni-
al."); Schweitzer, supra note 11, at 158-59.
"9 For contrary views, see Gordus, supra note 17, at 669-70, which argues
that application of this solemnization justification to the public school context
is erroneous, and Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil
Communion, and the Establishment Clause, 79 IOWA L. REV. 35, 61-63 (1993),
which contends that civic prayer is neither secular nor for a secular purpose.
2 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
783-84 n.39 (1973).
2 1 Although the Court has not struck down any laws for manifesting an
unconstitutionally endorsing purpose, with the adoption of the endorsement
test in County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 n.46, the Court would strike down
a law that "intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-91
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
22See supra note 18.
23 See Gordus, supra note 17, at 671 n.108 ("Before analyzing under the
primary effects text, it should be noted that this test has been largely super-
seded by the endorsement test."); Simson, supra note 17, at 912 ("Governmen-
tal endorsement of religion is an evil because it sends a message to
nonadherents that they should revise their beliefs or practices and that, if
they do not, they are not full-fledged members of the political community.")
19941 339
340 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:333
provides that the "Establishment Clause, at the very least,
prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community."'24 Since prayers at public school gradua-
tions appear to participants to be a state endorsement of reli-
gion,25 such prayers fail the effect/endorsement test in violation
of the Establishment Clause.
The third prong's "entanglement" test forbids the state from
fostering "an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion."'2 6 Ascertaining whether the involvement is excessive
entails an examination of "the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the
state provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority."27 This prong likely
would not be implicated in a graduation prayer situation in
which a school allowed students to organize and to offer the
prayer but did not itself participate in the organization of the
prayer.
With the exception of one case,2" the Lemon test, or its
(citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
' County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (quoting Lynch,
465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). See also The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Leading Cases - School Prayer, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 259 (1992) (arguing for an endorsement test that relies on an "exclusion
principle").
See infra part II.C.2.
26 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
27 Id. at 615. This prong is often the Charybdis to the effect tests Scylla,
because to ensure that a government benefit does not have the effect of
advancing or endorsing religion impermissibly, the government may be
required to monitor the beneficiary, thereby becoming excessively entangled in
the beneficiary's operations, for example:
The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsi-
dized teachers do not inculcate religion .... To ensure that no
trespass occurs, the State has therefore carefully conditioned its aid
with pervasive restrictions.... A comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to en-
sure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment
otherwise respected.... These prophylactic contacts will involve
excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.
Id. at 619.
' Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (relying on the unique history
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offshoot, the endorsement test, ruled the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence for twenty years. However, in several
recent decisions 9 the Court did not rely on Lemon, and justic-
es3 0 and commentators 1 have speculated as to its possible
dethronement. Notwithstanding its detractors, the three-
pronged test has not been overruled, 2 and it remains particu-
larly pertinent to public school graduation prayer cases.33
The Supreme Court did not apply the Lemon test in two
civic prayer cases: Marsh v. Chambers34  and Lee v.
Weisman23 In Marsh the Court held that opening a session of
the Nebraska legislature with a prayer given by a chaplain paid
by the state was not unconstitutional, because the unique
of legislative prayer to find no Establishment Clause violation).
' Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481 (1994) (striking down for failing to be religiously neutral a school district
created by the State along religious lines); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993) (finding "neutrally provide[d] benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion" constitutionally
permissible); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (using a coercion test to
preclude the offering of a prayer at a public school graduation).
30 Compare Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114
S. Ct. 2481, 2515 (1994) ("To replace Lemon with nothing is simply to an-
nounce that we are now so bold that we no longer feel the need even to
pretend that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is
governed by any principle.") (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Thomas, J.) with id., at 2494-95 (denying departure from principles of
Lemon).
" Compare Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
795 (1993); Ronald C. Kahn, God Save Us from the Coercion Test: Constitutive
Decision-making, Polity Principles, and Religious Freedom, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 903, 1004-08 (1993) (findingLemon "scattered"); and Suzanna Sherry,
Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 131 ("Lee v.
Weisman clearly signals the death ofLemon.. .) with David 0. Conkle, Lemon
Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993) and Ira C. Lupu, Which Old
Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen's Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 883, 888 (1993) ("Lemon themes will retain significant vitality in
Establishment Clause doctrine.").
32 See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141, 2148 n.7 (1993) (finding "this case... presents no occasion" to overrule
the Lemon test).
' See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2499-500 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (urging use of endorsement
test in "cases involving government speech on religious topics").
34463 U.S. 783 (1983).
35112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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history of legislative prayer indicated that the Framers of the
Constitution intended to permit such prayers.36 The Court
found this practice to be "deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country"37 and noted that the objecting party
"is an adult, presumably not readily susceptible to 'religious
indoctrination'.., or peer pressure."" Marsh involved histori-
cal analysis and unique facts inapplicable to the public school
context, and it is unlikely the Court would apply this reasoning
to a public school graduation prayer case. 9
The Lee Court held that school-organized prayers at high
school graduation ceremonies are unconstitutional because of
the potentially coercive nature of commencement prayers. The
Court's "coercion" test forbids the school from obliging atten-
dance and participation in a school-sponsored religious activi-
ty.4° This coercive effect may not be implicated if the prayer is
student-directed.4 In Lee the Court expressly declined to
apply the Lemon test, stating that "government involvement
with religious activity in this case is pervasive."'42 Thus, the
Court did not need to reach the endorsement issue.'
Although the Court may find that student-directed prayer
fails Lemon's purpose or entanglement test or the endorsement
or coercion test, the strongest constitutional challenge to such
36 463 U.S. at 786-91.
37 Id. at 786.
Id. at 792 (emphasis added). This note questions the insusceptibility of
adults. See infra part II.C.2.
'9 See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61 (distinguishing Marsh).
40 Id. at 2655.
4 Lower courts distinguished Lee on the basis that it involved school-
organized prayer, as opposed to student-directed prayer. See Jones v. Clear
Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2950 (1993); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla.),
appeal filed, No. 93-833 Civ-J-10 (11th Cir. 1994). But see Harris v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 1994 WL 651111 (9th Cir. 1994); Brody v. Spang,
957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992); Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F.
Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993); Griffith v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054, ruled
erroneous in Griffith v. Teran, 807 F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 1992).
42 Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
' See id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concprring) (joined by Stevens, J. and
O'Connor, J.) ("Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an
obvious indication that the government is endorsing religion."). See also id. at
2676-78 (Souter, J., concurring) (joined by Stevens, J. and O'Connor, J.)
(finding school unconstitutionally endorsed prayers).
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prayer is likely to come from Lemon's second prong, the effect
test, as updated by the endorsement test. The ef-
fectendorsement test is the prevailing standard and pertains
directly to the student-directed public school commencement
prayer issue.
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN
RELIGION-IN-PUBLIC SCHOOLS CASES
This section reviews cases in which the Supreme Court
faced issues relating to the endorsement of religion in public
schools. The Court's attention to the psychological impact of
religious messages on participants is essential to endorsement
analysis," but no Supreme Court opinion in this area, until
Lee, cited psychological studies in support of its assertions.'
The Justices frequently expressed assumptions about the im-
pressionability of the parties involved, but they failed to estab-
lish an empirical framework to evaluate this legitimate con-
cern.46 In order to ascertain the appropriate framework for
" For an excellent discussion of the preeminence and appropriateness of
the Court's use of perception and symbolism in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, see William P. Marshall, 'We Know It When We See It:" The Supreme
Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 532 (1986) ("A symbolic approach
absorbs the tensions within establishment ... in a manner in which a more
'objective'jurisprudence cannot. The question posed by the symbolic injury is
whether the challenged government action is perceived as improperly endors-
ing religion."); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, The Politics
of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503
(1992) (noting the central importance accorded symbolism in legal disputes
-regarding religion); cf Barbara J. Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism: Subjective
Experience as a Constitutional Variable, 47 VAND. L. REV. 273, 309 (1994)
("Thus, to become a plausible approach, the 'effects' prong of Justice
O'Connor's 'messages of endorsement' test must provide some means of
identifying the subjective experiences that will be credited, and those that will
not."). But see Smith, supra note 8 (criticizing the endorsement test and the
'Jurisprudence of symbolism"); Theodore C. Hirt, "Symbolic Union" of Church
and State and the "Endorsement" of Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Un-
wieldy Tools of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
823 (1989) (same).
See infra notes 47-66, 77 and accompanying text.
46 Only one Supreme Court opinion specifically referenced research in
developmental psychology. Although the research relied on is outdated, in his
Wisconsin v. Yoder dissent Justice Douglas foreshadowed the approach
advocated in this Note when he wrote:
But there is nothing in this record to indicate that the moral and intel-
lectual judgment demanded of the student by the question in this case is
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evaluating these assertions, the following case summaries focus
on psychological references in religion-in-public-schools cases.
1. Engel v. Vitale47
In the first public school prayer case decided by the Su-
preme Court, the Court ruled that required, daily, in-class
recitation of a twenty-two word, state-written prayer was
"religious activity"'  and contrary to the First Amendment.
The Court decided that mandatory prayer in school coerced
children into conforming to the dominant religion:
"The Establishment Clause... is violated by the enact-
ment of laws which establish an official religion wheth-
er those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing
individuals or not .... When the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion is plain.49
Thus, the Court assumes that the students are vulnerable to the
presumed pressure.
2. Abington School District v. Schempp °
In this case the Court held it unconstitutional to have in a
public high school mandatory, in-class daily Bible readings and
recitations of the Lord's Prayer. Although students could elect
not to participate,5 the Court quoted with approval the "indi-
rect coercive pressure" language of Engel.52 The Court found
beyond his capacity .... Moreover, there is substantial agreement
among child psychologists and sociologists that the moral and intellectual
maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that of the adult. See, e.g., J.
Piaget .... Kohlberg ....
406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
47 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
48 Id. at 424.
49 Id. at 430-31 (emphasis added).
50 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
51 Id. at 207.
52Id. at 221 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962)); See
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the exercise violated the Establishment Clause because it lacked
"a secular legislative purpose and [had] a primary effect that
neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion."5
In his concurrence, Justice Goldberg observed that:
The pervasive religiosity and direct governmental
involvement inhering in the prescription of prayer and
Bible reading in the public schools, during and as part
of the curricular day, involving young impressionable
children whose school attendance is statutorily com-
pelled, and utilizing the prestige, power, and influence
of school administration, staff, and authority... must
fall within the interdiction of the First Amendment.'
Thus, in addition to the pressures on the students the Court
previously noted in Engel, Justice Goldberg provides the first
glimpse of the idea of impressionability.55
3. Widmar v. Vincent
56
In Widmar the Supreme Court ruled that, in a university
community, religious groups have the same right to use univer-
sity facilities as do non-religious groups. The majority found
that:
University students are, of course, young adults. They
are less impressionable than younger students and
should be able to appreciate that the University's policy
is one of neutrality toward religion .... The
University's student handbook already notes that the
University's name will not "be identified in any way
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
374 U.S. at 222. This standard anticipates the Lemon test, discussed
supra part I.A.
Id. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
For a case in which a majority of the Court adopted this idea of impres-
sionability, see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) ("There is sub-
stance to the contention that college students are less impressionable and less
susceptible to religious indoctrination.") (citing Donald A. Gianella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part II, The
Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 583 (1968)).
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions
of any organization or its members.""7
Thus, according to Widmar, college students, as adults, are not
sufficiently impressionable as to believe the university endorses
the religious group. The existence of a disclaimer in the student
handbook facilitates the students' abilities to distinguish be-
tween student- and school-sponsored religious activities. 8
4. Wallace v. Jaffree"9
The Wallace Court used the Lemon test to find that an
Alabama law that authorized a one-minute period of silence in
all public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer"60 had no
secular purpose." The Court distinguished coercion from
influence and found that even the latter violated the Establish-
ment Clause: "That a child is offered an alternative may reduce
the constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by
the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the
school's domain. The law of imitation operates ..... 62 In this
case Justice O'Connor first noted that intentional "convey[ance
of] a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion" by the
government is the only requirement for finding an Establish-
ment Clause violation.6 ' Thus, the Court clearly determines
that the State may not influence, let alone coerce children with
regard to prayer, and it begins to recognize that the State may
not appear to favor or to disfavor religion.
57 Id. at 274 n.14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
5 See infra part III.B.3.
59 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
60 ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984).
61 472 U.S. at 56.
621 Id. at 60 n.51 (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
' Id. at 61 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). For a discussion of the purpose prong of the
endorsement test, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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5. Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens"
In Mergens the Court upheld the Equal Access Act,65
which prohibits denying voluntary, student religious groups
access to public secondary schools during non-instructional time:
Noting that the [Equal Access] Act extended the deci-
sion of [Widmar]... to public secondary schools, the
Court of Appeals concluded that "[a]ny constitutional
attack on the [Act] must therefore be predicated on the
difference between secondary school students and
university students." .... Because "Congress consid-
ered the difference in the maturity level of secondary
students and university students before passing the
[Act]," the Court of Appeals held, on the basis of
Congress' factfinding, that the Act did not violate the
Establishment Clause.... We now affirm.
66
The Court found that Congress determined 7 that secondary
6 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
The relevant section of the Act reads:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny
equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum
on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of
the speech at such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
496 U.S. at 234 (citations omitted).
67 '[The Senate Judiciary] Committee finds that students below the college
level are capable of distinguishing between State-initiated, school-sponsored,
or teacher-led religious speech on the one hand and student-initiated, student-
led religious speech on the other." S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1984
U.S.C.CA-N. 2381. However, this committee cited only Constitutional Dimen-
sions, supra note 9 in support of this finding. The Hearings did not include
testimony from anyone who purported to be a psychologist. Equal Access: A
First Amendment Question: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-294 (1983); Hearings on the Equal Access
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st. Sess..1-242 (1983). 'In fact, most students would not apprehend this distinction.
Lawrence F. Rossow & Nancy D. Rossow, Commentary, High School Prayer
Clubs: Can Students Perceive Religious Neutrality?, 45 ED. LAW REP. 475, 480
(1988) ([T]he findings tend to refute the position of Congress in their support
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school students, like college students, can distinguish State-
sponsored from student-sponsored religious activities. In this
case the school did not directly confront the students with a
decision of whether or not to participate in a religion-related
activity.
6. Religion-in-Public-Schools Cases Summation
Engel and Jaffree stand for the proposition that elementary
school children may not be confronted with religious activity or
choices in the classroom. According to Schempp, secondary
school children cannot be required to make decisions about
religion in class. However, students in secondary school
(Mergens), or college (Widmar), are mature enough to come into
contact with religious activity at school, providing it takes place
outside the classroom. In each of these cases, the Court's
perception of the impact of religious activity on students in their
public school plays a crucial role in its decision. The following
section presents three cases in which the courts focused on
coercion at the expense of the endorsement standard and there-
by regressed to a substantive, rather than symbolic, standard
for interpreting the Establishment Clause.
C. GRADUATION PRAYER CASES
This part of the Note discusses the Supreme Court's public
school graduation prayer case,6" and its interpretation in the
Fifth69 and Ninth"0 Circuits. In each instance, the presiding
court relied on the coercion test to reach its decision. The two
circuit courts also analyzed their cases under the endorsement
test. This part discusses in detail these three cases and propos-
of the Equal Access Act"); see also infra part II.C.2. Furthermore, this finding
was in made in the context of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (involv-
ing a private gathering without school employees) (supra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text), which differs from a public gathering that includes school
officials. Gordus, supra note 17, at 677 ("A Religious invocation ... is not
analogous to the religious club's access under the Equal Access Act in
Mergens.").
' Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
69 Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
'o Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 1994 WL 651111 (9th
Cir. 1994).
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es that the endorsement test provides a superior means of
evaluating them. It suggests that in order to make accurate
assessments of the constitutionality of public school graduation
prayers, courts must inform themselves about the psychological
impact of these prayers on ceremony participants.
1. Lee v. Weisman 71
The Supreme Court held by a five to four margin that an
invocation and a benediction given at the commencement
ceremony of the public Nathan Bishop Middle School in Provi-
dence, Rhode Island, violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.72 Over the protest of student Deborah
Weisman, the school principal decided to have prayers at the
ceremony, invited Rabbi Gutterman to offer them, and provided
guidance as to their content.7" The Court found that:
71 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
72 Id. Several years prior, Deborah Weisman's sister, at her commence-
ment, sat through an explicitly Christian prayer. The Weismans, who are
Jewish, protested. This time the school selected a rabbi to give the benedic-
tion. ROBERT S. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER, 211 (1994). One can only speculate
what the school would have done were the Weismans Satanists or atheists.
Kenneth Karst recounts an incident at a recent commencement ceremony at
U.C.L.A_ at which a saffron-robed Buddhist monk chanted the invocation in
the Pali language: "Afterward, the letters of protest poured in; some were
thoughtful and civil, and som& were the ink-and-paper equivalent of enraged
screams." KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS
OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER AND RELIGION 158 (1993). Cf
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800 n.10 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(relating protests arising from unpopular legislative prayers).
73 An administrator provided Rabbi Gutterman with a pamphlet drawn up
by the National Conference of Christians and Jews and asked him to keep the
prayers non-sectarian. 112 S. Ct. at 2655-56. Note the language of the
invocation:
'God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
'For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the
rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young
men and women grow up to enrich it.
'For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new gradu-
ates grow up to guard it.
'For the political process of America in which all its citizens may
participate, for its court system where all may seek justice we thank
You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
'For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of
Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share
it.
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State Officials direct the performance of a formal reli-
gious exercise at promotional and graduation ceremo-
nies for secondary schools. Even for those students
who object to the religious exercise, their attendance
and participation in the state-sponsored religious activi-
ty are in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the
school district does not require attendance as a condi-
tion for receipt of the diploma.74
The majority was particularly concerned about the "subtle
coercive pressures [that] exist... where the student had no real
alternative which would have allowed her to avoid the fact or
appearance of participation."75 The Court noted that psycho-
logical research "supports the common assumption that adoles-
cents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of
social convention."76
Although the Court explicitly concerned itself with one
aspect of the psychological impact of group prayer - the coer-
cion of participants - the research does not directly address the
problem with graduation prayer.77 This research suggests that
in a Mergens situation,7" for example, a student might feel
pressure from peers to join the schools Christian Club. Howev-
%May our aspirations for our country and for these young people,
who are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.'
AMEN'
Id. at 2652-53.
74 Id. at 2655.
71 Id. at 2656. For a discussion of the coercion test see supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
76 Id. at 2659.
77 The Court cites the following research: Clay V. Brittain, Adolescent
Choices and Parent-Peer Cross-Pressures, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 385 (1963)
(arguing that adolescents' conformity to their parents' or peers' opinions
depends on the content of the dilemma faced); Donna R. Clasen &
B. Bradford Brown, The Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in Adolescence,
14 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 451 (1985) (arguing that peer pressure tends to
decrease as students move through grads 7 to 12, and it varies according to
the student's social group and the content of the dilemma); B. Bradford Brown
et al., Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity Dispositions, and Self-
Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22 DEV. PSYCHOL. 521 (1986) (arguing
that although peer pressure usually is directed toward socially positive ends,
it is more likely to be influential when teens engage in misconduct).
" See supra part I.B.5.
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er, the coerciveness present in Mergens did not render the Equal
Access Act unconstitutional. 9 The key factor in an Establish-
ment Clause violation is the source of any endorsement, not
whether there is coercion; unconstitutionality requires State
involvement, regardless of peer or other pressure. The Lee
Court acknowledged this when it observed that "[w]hat to most
believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request
that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school
context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a reli-
gious orthodoxy."' Once the State is implicated, the percep-
tions of those participating become paramount. Courts must
use empirical evidence to ascertain whether those involved
apprehend that the State endorses religion.
Although a majority of the Justices agreed a coercion test
was sufficient in Lee, seven of the Justices questioned the
general utility of the test."' Justice Souter's concurrence noted
several cases in which the issue of coercion was not disposi-
tive."2 In his view, the issue was that the activities conveyed
the message of State support of religion.83 In dissent, Justice
79 See id.
80 112 S. Ct. at 2658 (emphasis added).
8 1 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor observed that
"[o]ver the years, this Court has declared the invalidity of many noncoercive
state laws and practices conveying a message of religious endorsement." Id.
at 2671 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas referred to the psychological
coercion test as an "instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of [the Court's
efforts at] social engineering ... and boundlessly manipulable." Id. at 2679
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 2672 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 589-594, 598-602 (1989); Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 61, 67-
84 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968); Edward v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987); Grand
Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985); see also Texas Monthly v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17, 28 (1989)).
' Justice Souter distinguished between coercion and the appearance of
state-supported religion:
[W]ithout contesting the dissent's observation that the creche
coerced no one into accepting or supporting whatever message it
proclaimed, five Members of the Court found its display unconstitu-
tional as a state endorsement of Christianity .... [County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,] 589-594, 598-602, 109 S. Ct. at
3098-3101, 3103-3105 [(1989)] .... And in School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball 473 U.S. 373, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 87 L. Ed. 2d 267
1994]
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Scalia lambasted the majority's use of psychological research.
84
Justice Scalia argued that a "few citations of '[r]esearch in
psychology' that have no particular bearing upon the precise
issue here... cannot disguise the fact that the Court has gone
beyond the realm where judges know what they are doing.
85
Justice Scalia suggested that a school might circumvent Lee
by announcing or inserting into the program a disclaimer "to the
effect that, while all are asked to rise for the invocation and
benediction, none is compelled to join in them, nor will be
assumed, by rising, to have done so."86 Per Widmar, a dis-
claimer could notify participants as to the State's
nonsponsorship of religion." A disclaimer might assist some
individuals in distinguishing school from private endorsement,
but empirical evidence indicates that many people likely would
not benefit from a disclaimer."5
It is not surprising that the Lee Court found that secondary
school students were confronted with a religious practice in
violation of the Establishment Clause when the school selected
and directed the prayer.89 However, when students initiate
and deliver the prayer, the school's involvement in the support
of religion decreases. This makes the following decision a closer
case.
(1985), we invalidated a program whereby the State sent public
school teachers to parochial schools to instruct students on osten-
sibly nonreligious matters; while the scheme clearly did not coerce
anyone to receive or subsidize religious instruction, we held it
invalid because, among other things, "It]he symbolic union of church
and state inherent in the [program] threatens to convey a message
of state support of religion to students and to the general public."
Id. at 397 ....
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
See id. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 2681. This Note agrees that the focus on a coercive environment
is misplaced and that the Court reached beyond support provided by the cited
evidence. However, the use of psychological research to determine when an
audience perceives state endorsement is appropriate. Expertise is available
and should inform future Court decisions.
86 Id. at 2685.
8 7Supra text accompanying note 57.
See infra part III.B.3.
a See Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D.
Va. 1993) ("The degree of state sponsorship in Lee made it an 'easy' case").
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2. Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District90
The Supreme Court vacated Jones91 and sent it to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration in light
of Lee. In Jones II, the Fifth Circuit reapplied the Lemon,
endorsement, and coercion tests. Notwithstanding Lee, the
court held the Establishment Clause not violated when public
high school seniors, by majority vote, choose to have a nonsec-
tarian, nonproselytizing, student-delivered prayer at their
graduation ceremony.92 According to the Fifth Circuit, prayer
is less coercive if it is offered by a student-elected peer. The
difference is that a student would be "less able to coerce partici-
pation than an authority figure from the state or cler-
gy .... [The] Court [hals previous[ly] recogni[zed] that graduat-
ing seniors 'are less impressionable than younger students."'93
The Jones II court failed to note the irrelevancy of the question
of whether graduating students generally are less impression-
able than younger students to the question of whether peers or
authority figures exert the greater pressure to conform.9
The Fifth Circuit considered the participants' perceptions
when it stated that the State "unconstitutionally endorse[s]
religion when a reasonable person would view the challenged
government action as a disapproval of her contrary religious
choices."" The court equated the "reasonable person" with the
"graduating high school senior" when it noted that in "Mergens
... a graduating high school senior who participates in the
decision as to whether her graduation will include an invocation
by a fellow student volunteer will understand that any religious
references are the result of student, not government, choice."9
90 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
91 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
Jones II, 977 F.2d at 963.
9 Id. at 971 (quoting Board of Educ. of the Westside Comm. Schs. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235-37 (1996)).
' In fact, the concern with authority figures seems contrary to the
Supreme Court's concern in Lee with peer pressure. However, one of the
studies cited in Lee noted that parents have greater power than do peers over
a student's decision in an area in which a student perceives parents to have
greater competence. Presumably, religion would fall within the parents' do-
main. See Brittain, supra note 77.
95 Jones II, 977 F.2d at 968.
9' Id. at 969. The Court then quoted Mergens:
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Thus, in Jones 1 the Fifth Circuit determined that students are
less coerced by student-directed, as opposed to school-directed
prayers. It analogized its case to Mergens, a case in which the
State at most only indirectly, that is, outside of a school-directed
setting, confronted students with a religion-oriented choice: join
or do not join. In a commencement ceremony, however, the
confrontation is direct: pray or do not pray. Finally, the court
implied that the maturity of secondary students equals that of
adults. However, the ability of students or adults to perceive
school sponsorship of religion is an empirical question requiring
further exploration.97
3. Harris v. Joint School District No. 24198
The Ninth Circuit rejected public school graduation prayers
in a factually stronger case for constitutionality than Jones II
presented.99 The Harris students purportedly made all deci-
sions pertaining to the commencement, including whether to
have it at all.00 They decided whether they would include at
their graduation a prayer, and, if so, selected who would offer
it.' 01 The prayer was not a part of the rehearsal, and at the
ceremony, "no one [wals asked to participate in the prayer by
standing, bowing their heads, or removing their hats."'0 ° Fur-
thermore, since 1991 the commencement program carried a
[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect. We think that secondary students are mature
enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse
or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis.
Id. at 969 (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250).
" See infra part II.C.
98 41 F.3d 447, 1994 WL 651111 (9th Cir. 1994).
977 F.2d at 963 (see supra part I.C.2.).
o Harris, 1994 WL 65111 at *6.
101 Id. at *5.
10 2 Id. at *6. One might question how the school district could make these
assurances, because "it is the senior students themselves, not the principal,
who determine every element of their graduations." Id. at *5. In fact, the
principal agreed that "school officials would not interfere with a graduation
planned by the senior class even if the students voted to 'have the whole thing
be a religious service."' Id. at *6.
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disclaimer that disavowed any relationship between the school
district and any statements made during graduation.
0 3
The court observed that "[t]he notion that a person's consti-
tutional rights may be subject to a majority vote is... anathe-
ma,'11°4 and that "elected officials cannot absolve themselves of
a constitutional duty by delegating their responsibilities to a
nongovernmental entity[, because e]ven private citizens when
acting with government authority must exercise that authority
constitutionally."'0 5 The court also refuted the school district's
assertion that the school established "an open forum in which
student speech is allowed on a nondiscriminatory basis."'0'
The forum is not open because
[n]o matter what message a minority of students may
wish to convey, the graduation forum is closed to them.
A forum that allows only selected speakers to convey an
established message and forecloses a significant portion
of its members from any speech at all is not open in the
required sense.' °7
Notwithstanding the school district's apparent abdication of
responsibility for the commencement exercise, the court held
that a prayer offered at commencement would offend the Estab-
lishment Clause. Following the Supreme Court's decision in
Lee, '0 the Ninth Circuit ruled the ceremony was coercive and
found the district failed the Lemon test. The court determined
'o The disclaimer stated:
The Board of Trustees of Joint School District No. 241 neither
promotes nor endorses any statements made by any person involved
in the graduation ceremony. The District endorses each person's
free exercise of speech and religion and any comments or state-
ments made during the graduation ceremony should not be consid-
ered the opinions or beliefs of the District, the Board of Trustees or
the Superintendent.
Id.
'o Id. at *8 (quoting Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp.
1097, 1100 (E.D. Va. 1993)).
'05 Id. (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
1 6 Id. at *10.
1
07 Id. But see generally Gregory M. McAndrew, Note, Invocations at
Graduation, 101 YALE L.J. 663 (1991) (arguing for an Equal Access approach
to public school graduation prayer).
108 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (see supra part I.C.1.).
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that the district materially underwrote, and had ultimate
control over, the event.' The district materially supported
the event in that it provided the building and other expenses,
such as the commencement programs."0  The district con-
trolled the event in that the students' responsibility for it
existed only because the district granted responsibility to
them."' The court concluded that "[o]nce the requisite state
involvement is shown, the case is indistinguishable from
Lee."'11
The Harris court also found the prayer violative of the
Lemon test. The prayer failed the purpose prong"3 because
its solemnization aspect "is insufficient in this case to secularize
what is objectively and inherently religious.""' 4 Under the
second prong, "the primary effect of such prayer appears to
advance religion.'""' The court did not articulate its assump-
tions about the capacities of students to perceive endorsement,
but it discussed the prayer's impact on them:
The student in the religious minority is well aware that
the school has delegated authority over the prayers to
the majority of her classmates while retaining ultimate
control over the school-sponsored meeting. The student
is also aware that the effect of the delegation is that
her religious views are subordinated to the majority's.
While the district asserts that it 'neither promotes nor
endorses' the stated views, this ... flies in the face of
what the student knows is occurring." 6
109 Harris, 1994 WL 65111, at *7.
110 Id.
"I Id.
112 Id. at *11.
"I "A government practice ... fails the purpose prong of Lemon if its
purpose is to endorse a religious custom or viewpoint." Id. (quoting Kreisner
v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
690 (1994)) (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying notes 17-19 for a
discussion of this prong.
14 Harris, 1994 WL 651111, at *11.
... Id. (emphasis added).
... Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
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In Harris, the court's assumptions about the students' percep-
tions are correct,11 7 but the split in the circuits suggests that
courts might benefit by considering findings from the field of
psychology that speak to the graduation prayer issue.
4. Summary of Current Graduation Prayer Law
According to the Fifth Circuit, whether the school or the
students organize and deliver the graduation prayer determines
its constitutionality. The Ninth Circuit explicitly disagreed with
that assessment and held such prayers unconstitutional in
either circumstance. To date, the Supreme Court has neither
confirmed nor denied these interpretations.
The courts focused on the content of the message and its
coerciveness and failed to consider empirically the impact of the
message on its recipients. Whether graduating seniors or others
involved in the commencement ceremony perceive state estab-
lishment does not depend exclusively on the extent to which the
school orchestrates the prayer; state establishment also depends
on the impact of that orchestration on those involved. The
following section summarizes one area of developmental psy-
chology that provides a key to understanding the basis for, and
limits of, the perceptions of those faced with public school
graduation prayer.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT
This section introduces an area of psychology that is readily
applicable to the public school graduation prayer context. It
sets forth the fundamental tenets of the social perspective-
taking branch of developmental psychology, an empirically
validated theory that elucidates the stages through which
individuals develop their ability to interpret their environment.
This section proceeds with examples of these stages and analyz-
es findings that indicate that the great majority of individuals
who witness a public school graduation prayer would perceive
state endorsement of the prayer. It closes with a discussion of
"develocracy," which is concerned with the assignment of consti-
tutional rights according to an individual's developmental
status. Due to the religious aspects of the commencement
prayer and the psychological development of those who would
117 See infra part H.C.2.
1994] 357
358 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:333
perceive it, public schools violate the Constitution if they permit
prayers at their graduation ceremonies.
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Social perspective-taking is an empirically based theory in
developmental psychology that charts the underlying structure
of individuals' social conceptions of human nature and examines
how individuals coordinate those conceptions."' Lawrence
Kohlberg outlined the essentials of this area of psychology and
described how the approach could be applied to social knowledge
and to understanding the social world."' Although Kohlberg
focused on moral development rather than on social perspective-
taking, 2 ° the theoretical underpinning of social perspective-
taking is readily adapted from Professors Colby's and Kohlberg's
discussion of moral development.ul
According to social perspective-taking theory, how an actor
thinks about a social question is based on that actor's interpre-
118 This approach to human cognition is an outgrowth of the work of James
Mark Baldwin, George Herbert Mead, and Jean Piaget:
The hallmark of such research is an interest in describing an
invariant sequence of cognitively based stages, or qualitatively
distinct ways of organizing and understanding a certain domain of
experience, through which all children pass. In contrast to other
approaches, the emphasis is on the structure rather than on the
content of thought, on universal patterns of thinking rather than on
emotions or behavior.
ROBERT L. SELMAN, THE GROWTH OF INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING 23
(Developmental Psychology Series, Harry Beilin, series ed., 1980). Professor
Selman is associated with Harvard University's Graduate School of Education
and with Boston's Judge Baker Guidance Center.
119 Id. at 24.
120 Professor Selman clarifies the distinction between his and Professor
Kohlberg's approaches:
If moral judgment stages refer to the development of progressively
more adequate theories about how individuals should act, think,
and feel with regard to one another, each level of social perspective
taking might be seen as referring to the basis for a progressively
more adequate theory about why and how individuals do think and
act in relation to each other. In this sense, the constructs of moral
judgment and perspective taking could be seen as overlapping.
Id. at 35 n.5 (citations omitted).
121 "Kohlberg's model is important in social cognition and generally
theoretically compatible with our own [social perspective-taking] work." Id. at
35.
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tation of the given circumstances. 2 Social beliefs and opin-
ions, as distinguished from the content of a particular social
judgment, are learned and used via an organized or patterned
structure observable in humans.'23 Individuals create mean-
ing in the world based on their level of development; each new
stage builds on the previous stage in an observable and predict-
able sequence.' Four criteria identify the cognitive stages
through which each human passes:
1. Each structure (mode of thought) differs qualitatively, but
all are vehicles for the same functions, e.g., intelligence.
2. Cultural factors may limit development, but what develop-
ment occurs proceeds in an invariant sequence.
3. Responses to tasks manifest an underlying organization
that forms a structural whole and a consistent mode of
thinking.
4. Each developmental stage integrates the earlier stages.'
This theory of social development proposes that individuals
learn to integrate increasingly complex perceptions in distinct,
discernable stages throughout their cognitive lives.
126
This research on psychological development provided the
springboard for the work of Michael L. Commons, who theorizes
that social cognitive development continues into adulthood."
2 ANNE COLBY & LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE MEAsuREMEINr OF MORAL
JUDGMENT 1-2 (1987).
1 Id. at 2.
1 1 Id. at 5.
m See SELMAN, supra note 118, at 76-79; see also COLBY & KOHLBERG,
supra note 122, at 6-7.
' One developmental psychologist explained that:
IThe young child comes to social experience with a set of immature
but continually developing cognitive structures, which provide the
means for the reinterpretation (assimilation) of social experience at
a level that makes sense for the child. At the same time, relevant
social experiences that do not quite make sense to the child at a
particular level provide the elements for the child to change his or
her own organizational structure (to accommodate) to one that is
more advanced cognitively. The child is enabled thereby to inter-
pret greater complexities of social organization.
SELMAN, supra note 118, at 79.
1 "Piaget claimed that the attainment of 'formal operations' in adolescence
marked the end point of development for cognitive structure. Current re-
search, however, does not support this claim; forms of thought have been
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Because Commons and other developmental psychologists'
have studied the application of social perspective-taking to the
religion-in-public-schools context, this note considers the validity
of these developmental psychologies, and then applies this
research specifically to graduation prayer.
B. THE VALIDITY OF SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
The psychology research used in this Note conforms to
criteria that validate social scientific empirical studies useful to
jurists: 1) critical review of the scientific community; 2) employ-
ment of valid research methods; 3) generalizability to the case
at issue; and 4) support by a body of other research.
129
First, each of the studies cited was published "in refereed
journals, or in books that have professional editorial boards
found in adulthood that are qualitatively different from those found in adoles-
cence." Michael L. Commons et al., A Multidomain Study of Adult Develop-
ment, in ADULT DEVELOPMENT, VOL. I: COMPARISONS AND APPLICATIONS OF
DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS 33, 33 (Michael L. Commons et al. eds., 1989); see
also John M. Rybash & Paul A. Roodin, Making Decisions About Health-Care
Problems: A Comparison of Formal and Postformal Modes of Competence, in
id. at 217, 220. But see DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: A PSYCHOLEGAL ANALYSIS 90 (1989) [hereinafter CHIL-
DREN] ("Qualitative differences between children and adults in the sophistica-
tion of their reasoning, understanding, and decision making disappear no later
than age 11 or 12.").
' Commons, a lecturer and research associate in the Department of
Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts Mental Health
Center, and director of the Dare Institute, coauthored an article with Joseph
A. Rodriguez of Harvard University: Michael L. Commons & Joseph A.
Rodriguez, "Equal Access" Without "Establishing" Religion: The Necessity for
Assessing Social Perspective-Taking Skills and Institutional Atmosphere, 10
DEV. REV. 323 (1990). That article was in response to an article by David
Moshinan, a professor of educational psychology at the University of Nebras-
ka-Lincoln. David Moshman, Equal Access for Religion in Public Schools? An
Empirical Approach to a Legal Dilemma, 10 DEV. REV. 184 (1990) [hereinafter
Equal Access]. Moshman replied to Commons & Rodriguez in David
Moshman, Equal Access for All Students: A Reply to Commons and Rodriguez,
10 DEV. REV. 341 (1992) [hereinafter Reply].
1 John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
499 (1986). see also Scott V. Carroll, Lee v. Weisman: Amateur Psychology or
an Accurate Representation of Adolescent Development, How Should Courts
Evaluate Psychological Evidence, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLar 513
(1994) (applying Monahan's and Walker's work to the studies cited by the
majority in Lee).
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.... Such a review process goes far in screening out empirical
assertions unsupported by the data."'30  This "appellate re-
view" indicates that "several disinterested social scientists,
chosen largely for their own scientific accomplishments, have re-
viewed the research and have found it worthy of publica-
tion."'' Thus, the research on which this Note relies survived
the critical review of the scientific community.
Second, "[riandom assignment [should be utilized to] as-
sure[] to the maximum extent possible that the findings ob-
tained are the result of the factor that the researcher wishes to
study .... ,,132 The studies utilized random samples. 13  Fur-
thermore, the studies cited rely on highly correlated results on
a large number of subjects.'34 Accordingly, the research ad-
duced herein is valid.
Third, the studies are generalizable "across persons,"
"across settings," and "over time."'35 Developmental research
has been conducted on adolescent perceptions in different
environments across the world and for decades.'36 Although
application of this research to graduation prayer has not been
attempted, this approach has been employed in the Establish-
ment Clause endorsement context
3 7
30 Monahan & Walker, supra note 129, at 500 (citing Summary Report of
Journal Operations: 1984, 40 AM. PSYCHOL. 707 (1985)).
131 Id.
112 Id. at 505.
" See, e.g., Patricia F. Arlin, Cognitive Development in Adulthood: A Fifth
Stage? 11 DEv. PSYCHOL. 602, 604 (1975).
'L See, e.g., James R. Rest, Moral Research Methodology, in LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG: CONSENSUS & CONTROvERSY 455, 466 (Sohan Modgil & Celia
Modgil eds., 1986) (describing scoring procedure results in a longitudinal study
of more than twenty years as "spectacular"); ANNE COLBY & LAW-
RENCE KOHLBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT, VOL. I: THEO-
RETICAL FOUNDATIONs & RESEARCH VALIDATION (1987).
' Rest, supra note 134, at 506-07.
6 See, e.g., Carolyn Pope Edwards, Cross-Cultural Research on Kohlberg's
Stages: The Basis for Consensus, in LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, supra note 134, at
425-26 (listing worldwide research, including longitudinal studies from the
Bahamas, French Canada, Israel, Great Britain and Turkey); John Snarey et
al., The Sociomoral Development of Kibbutz Adolescents: A Longitudinal
Cross-Cultural Study, 21 DEV. PSYCHOL. 3 (1984) (citing study of Israeli
kibbutz adolescents).
137 See, e.g., Reply, supra note 128; Commons & Rodriguez, supra note 128;
-Equal Access, note 128; Rossow & Rossow, supra note 67.
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Fourth, the studies are supported by a body of other re-
search.138  Although research specifically addressing gradua-
tion school prayer would be beneficial, extrapolating the general
social perspective-taking, advanced stages approach to gradua-
tion prayer is consistent with the research in this area.
In sum, although the application of developmental studies
to the public school graduation prayer context is new, the
validity of the research underlying the approach espoused in
this section is well supported. The social perspective-taking
studies used in this Note greatly illuminate the public school
prayer problem, notwithstanding the need for research specifi-
cally devoted to this area.139 As Moshman noted, "[judges do
not have the luxury of calling for further psychological research.
The question, then, is whether available evidence can provide
any guidance. The alternative is for judges to rely on their
intuitions or stereotypes regarding adolescents."'40 According-
ly, the following section applies the most relevant psychological
research, social perspective-taking, to the graduation prayer
context.
C. THE APPLICATION OF SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE-TAING
As discussed above, social perspective-taking is based on
sequential frameworks through which individuals integrate
relationships and from which they draw conclusions about what
they perceive.' "Individuals must detect how their behavior
is caused and what effect it has, not only on themselves but on
others."'42 As persons pass through the various stages their
perspectives become less egocentric, and, if they progress suffi-
138 See, e.g., id.
139 Rossow & Rossow, supra note 9, at 217 ("Turning to the psychological
literature to help settle the opposing positions on student maturity is a step in
the right direction. However, a review of the psychological literature is not
sufficient. Social scientific research directly aimed at answering the particular
question is needed."); see also Carroll, supra note 129, at 539 ("Undoubtedly,
further research in adolescent social and cognitive psychology is essential
before a constitutional rule of law can be predicated on the basis of mere
empirical findings.")
140 Reply, supra note 128, at 344.
141 Commons & Rodriguez, supra note 128, at 331.
142 Id. at 327.
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ciently, they develop the ability to understand others' view-
points and the frameworks that shape those views."4
This part of the Note tracks with specificity the stages
through which an individual may progress. It focuses on the
stages pivotal to understanding what attendees would perceive
if faced with a public school graduation prayer and provides
examples of court opinions that illustrate these stages. The
Note then discusses the danger of "develocracy," which is the
according of rights to individuals based on their developmental
status. It concludes that schools violate the First Amendment
if they permit public school commencement prayers.
4 Id. at 331.
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1. The Social Perspective-Taking Scheme'
To illustrate their findings concerning social perspective-
taking, Commons and Rodriguez postulate the actions a princi-
pal might take in deciding how to assign rooms to competing
student groups. 45 Although the following examples are not
specifically related to religion, when read in light of the social
perspective-taking scheme they shed light on the type of think-
ing that occurs in individuals of each stage. In each successive
stage the perceiver casts a wider and finer net into the percep-
tual sea, thereby taking in more, and more nuanced, informa-
14 Commons and Rodriguez describe the stages of social perspective-taking
as:
Preoperational 2b (112): Differentiate between their own physical
and psychological actions. Another's subjective state is thought to
be inferable by simple physical observation.
Primary 3a (2): Second-person perspective begins. See that own
behavior leads to personal outcomes, or that other's behavior leads
to other's outcomes. Individuals assume that other people see the
world the same way as they do ....
Concrete 3b (2/3): Perceives relationship between self and other by
seeing causes for own action and how own actions affect other's be-
havior ....
Abstract 4a (3): Asserts a third-person or neutral other by general-
izing cause-and-effect chains of two individuals' behavior. When a
neutral observer cannot determine which side in a social conflict is
correct, the outcome preferred by the largest number of persons is
adopted as the most neutral ....
Formal 4b (3/4): Isolates specific causal relations in complex sets of
interactions in a linear fashion. Detects the actual causal chain of
command in the hierarchy as well ....
Systematic 5a (4): See behavioral framework of other as integrated
system of traits, beliefs, experiences; coordinates linear causality
with hierarchical social organization; places different perspectives
in hierarchy of preference ....
Metasystematic 5b (5): Compares, contrasts, transforms, and
synthesizes individuals' perspectives and understands that
everyone's behavior shapes their own perspective and vice-ver-
sa ....
Paradigmatic 6a (6): Recognizes that independently constructed
perspectives are either incomplete or inconsistent, and understands
the necessity of co-construction of new perspectives through dia-
logue and collaboration.
Note: General stage model numbers are first; Kohlberg's and
Selman's numbers are in parentheses.
Id. at 330.
'45 Id. at 330-39.
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tion. The discussion below illustrates how, as her developmental
level rose, a hypothetical principal would manifest an increased
understanding of the circumstances presented, her role with
respect to those circumstances, and the response she might
make appropriate to those circumstances.
For example, a principal at stage 3a, with only primary
perspective-taking skills, would select the group most helpful to
the principal." A stage 3b, "concrete" principal would try to
encourage good behavior by selecting the group most helpful to
other students. 4 ' An "abstract," stage 4a principal would
attempt to decide on apparently neutral grounds and would pick
the most popular club or the club with the most members.'
In order to dissociate herself personally from the selection
process, a "formal," stage 4b principal would hold an elec-
tion. 49 A "systematic" (postformal) principal operating at
stage 5a would attempt to remove the decision-making from
other actors as well as from herself by selecting a group on a
precedential (seniority) basis. 5 ' A principal at
"metasystematic" stage 5b would use chance to determine
allocation of the room in order to "recognize[] the validity of the
perspective of the least preferred person.' ' 51 A stage 6a prin-
cipal might meet with representatives of the groups to facilitate
a consensus among them as to how to assign the rooms.'52
Thus, as the principal progresses through each stage, she evi-
dences an increasingly inclusive and just approach to the prob-
lem confronting her.
2. Findings Regarding Social Perspective-Taking
Skills
According to Commons and Rodriguez, an individual must
function at metasystematic stage 5b or above to discern whether
or not a school establishes religion by permitting commence-
ment prayer.'53 Their findings necessitate this, because those
148 Id. at 330.
147 Id.
4 8 Id.
149 Id. at 331.
160 Id. at 333.
151 Id. at 330.
152Id.
1" Cf id. at 329 (discussing the stage necessary to perceive an establish-
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involved must be capable of "taking other individuals' perspec-
tives on the conflict,"'" rather than considering the prayer
offeror only as "part of a system of actions and events."'55 In
other words, the perceiver must be able to distinguish the
person from the program. Justice O'Connor's endorsement
approach exemplifies the 5b perspective and evidences regard
for the individual notwithstanding the prevailing cultural ethos.
The endorsement test is sensitive to the "perspective of the least
preferred person ' in that it precludes "making adherence to
a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community."'57 Because individuals at stage 5b evi-
dence "a highly sophisticated moral orientation that is rare,
even in adults,"'55 the great majority of those present at a
public school graduation that included prayer would perceive
that the school endorsed the prayer.
With sufficient specific training, an individual operating at
systematic stage 5a also would be able to detect the source of an
establishment of religion.'59 However, not even fifty percent
of the adult population ever reaches this stage. 6 Justice
Scalia's dissent in Lee, in which he argues that "cultural heri-
tage" and "historical practices" should be dispositive, 161 exem-
ment of religion in an equal access case).
154 Id.
'
6 5 Id. at 334 (describing someone at systematic stage 5a).
156 Id. at 330.
5  Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
"8 CHILDREN, supra note 127, at 82; see also JOHN M. RYBASH ET AL.,
ADULT COGNITION AND AGING: DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES IN PROCESSING,
KNOWING AND THINKING 49 (Pergamon Genl Psychol. Series No. 139, 1986)
("Richard and Commons (1984) found that few undergraduate students
displayed metasystematic thinking, whereas most graduate students did.").
... Commons & Rodriguez, supra note 128, at 333 (citing Arlin, supra note
133, at 606 (proposing "problem-finding" stage that evidences "creative
thought, the envisioning of new questions, and the discovery of new heuristics
in adult thought)). Cf Equal Access, supra note 128, at 191 (contending that
something as simple as a sign explaining that the prayer is student- and not
school-orchestrated might be sufficient to dispel mature students' confusion
about the voluntariness of the activity.
160 See Arlin, supra note 133, at 605 ("[Ilt has been widely demonstrated
that only 50% of the adult population even attains the Piagetian stage of
formal operational thinking, the problem-solving stage.").
.61 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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plifies stage 5a reasoning. One who operates at this stage "is
disposed to turn over the matter to a power other than the
actors involved ... to the society, so to speak, deciding the
matter on basis of precedent that preserves the social order....
'[F]irst come, first served.""62  This method has the effect of
excluding each interest that was not first in line, and therefore
it is not neutral. Thus, even with specific instruction in discern-
ing religious establishment, an individual at stage 5a would per-
ceive the school endorsed the prayer if the prayer were allowed
in accordance with the Lee minority's "first come, first [and
only] served" Establishment Clause test.
Formal stage 4b is the highest stage at which most high
school students operate. 6 ' This is "the modal stage of the
adult population and the stage at which informed decision-
making seems to begin. About [one-third] of the adult popula-
tion reasons at ... Stage 4b."'" Moshman found that begin-
ning at approximately ages ten to twelve individuals often
display mature reasoning and that differences from adult
reasoning could usually be easily eliminated." Although
"some students [at Stage 4b] are prepared to detect whether
' Commons & Rodriguez, supra note 12., at 333.
163Id. at 331.
4Id. at 333. Cf Lawrence Kohlberg & Carol Gilligan, The Adolescent as
a Philospher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World, 100
DAEDALUS 1051, 1065 (1971) (reporting that only 45% of the adolescents tested
reached formal operations in moral (versus social perspective-taking) develop-
ment by age 15).
" Equal Access, supra note 128, at 188. However, Moshman tested
propositional (logical) reasoning abilities, not social perspective-taking,
therefore his research is less suited to the task of gauging perspectives on the
complex, socially-embedded dilemma posed by graduation prayer. Commons
& Rodriguez, supra note 128, at 329. Moshman does not dispute that assess-
ment, Reply, supra note 128, at 344, and he agrees that development in adults
often reaches levels beyond those typical of adolescents. Id. at 345.
Selman's research indicates early maturity, consistent with Moshman's
findings, but Selman's work predates most of the studies on adult substages.
Approximate ages of typical perspective-taking stage-dwellers are as follows:
Level Concepts of Persons and Relations Ages
[1] Undifferentiated and Egocentric 3 to 6
[2) Differentiated and Subjective 5 to 9
[3] Self-Reflective/Second-person and Reciprocal 7 to 12
[4] Third-person and Mutual Perspective Taking 10 to 15
[5] In-depth and Societal-Symbolic 12 to Adult
SELMAN, supra note 118, at 37-40.
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religion has been established ... if so directed,' ' 66 they would
detect establishment if the method for selecting the solemniza-
tion were non-neutral. 16  The court in Jones 11168 sanctioned
school administrators who, consistently with stage 4b reasoning,
apparently attempted to "disassociate themselves personally
from deciding a social conflict ... [but] refer[red] the matter
over to an authority other than the self to make the deci-
sion.... [by] 'holding an election."' 169 Because basing a deci-
sion to have prayer on an election would have the effect of
excluding the participants who are not in the majority, even
trained students would perceive school endorsement under the
Lee minority's or Jones 11 majority's approach. Neither ap-
proach is neutral.
Thus, students below the high school age and operating at
stages below 4b would not be able to understand, even with
explanation, that even a random method'. for selecting a
prayer at a school ceremony was not a school endorsement of
the prayer offered.' No one disputes that "elementary school
students would not comprehend the abstract distinction between
voluntary and school-endorsed activities and might fail to fully
grasp it even if it were carefully explained."'7 2 Thus, unless
officials refuse to allow children or less developmentally mature
teenagers, especially unescorted ones, to witness the graduation
prayer,'73 the inclusion of prayer at the commencement cere-
mony violates the Establishment Clause. 4
16 Common & Rodriguez, supra note 128, at 333.
167 Cf. id. at 336 ("If enough students perform at both the abstract and
formal operational stages ... having religious clubs in an atmosphere with
free speech, press, and assembly seems reasonable.") (emphasis added).
18 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
... Commons & Rodriguez, supra note 128, at 331.
170 See infra, part III.B.2.
171 Cf Rossow & Rossow, supra note 67, at 480 ("Overall, these findings
tend to support the position of the federal courts that high school students,
unlike their college counterparts, are not able to perceive religious neutrali-
ty.").
172 Equal Access, supra note 128, at 191.
17See infra, part III.B.4 (discussing problems with allowing such individu-
als to view the graduation prayer).
174 This lowest common denominator concern - not allowing prayer because
some people necessarily would perceive state endorsement - seems analogous
to the concern in Free Speech jurisprudence that public discourse ought not be
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3. Develocracy
One commentator characterized discrimination on the basis
of psychological development as "develocracy."'7  Although
distinguishing between children's and adults' constitutional
rights is virtually (and empirically justifiably) a fact of life in
the United States, 6 basing rights on developmental status
raises the specter of discriminating between adults.'" In
response to this concern, Moshman calls for pegging full consti-
tutional- rights at the level of the "minimally normal adult."'178
relegated to the level of children. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957) (disallowing the banning of sales to the general public of materials with
sexual content unsuitable for children). However, whereas the Speech and
Religion Clauses both mandate free expression or exercise, the Speech Clause
does not have an analogue to the anti-establishment requirement of the
Religion Clause. Accordingly, because the State has an affirmative duty under
the Establishment Clause to forbid religious discourse, even if only children
would understand it to be establishing religion, constitutionality must be
based on what any person reasonably likely to witness the religious speech
would understand with respect to establishment. The problem with children
and "too much" free speech is not per se a constitutional issue - it is arguably
a moral problem.
17 Gerhard Sonnert, Commentary: Develocracy vs. Democracy, 12 DEV.
REV. 431, 433 (1992).
Both Moshman and Commons and Rodriguez recommended an em-
pirical solution to the constitutional dilemma. If and only if the
students' reasoning and/or perspective-taking abilities have devel-
oped to a stage where the students understand the difference
between the existence of voluntary student groups and an official
endorsement of religion should religious groups be permissible in
public schools. Thus, developmental stage becomes the criterion for
a constitutional right.
Id. at 431.
17 See, e.g., David Moshman, Children's Intellectual Rights: A First
Amendment Analysis, in CHILDREN's INTELLECTUAL RIGHTs 25, 37 (NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR CHmD DEVELOPMENT No. 33, William Damon ed., 1986);
CHILDREN, supra note 127, at 90; Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile
Offenders to be Punished: Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68
NEB. L. REv. 182, 192-93 (1989) (arguing for a constitutional right for juve-
niles to be punished and noting that "various studies indicate that most
adolescents, unlike most pre-adolescent children, possess the same moral
reasoning skills as adults.").
177 See, e.g., Equal Access, supra note 128, at 189.
.78 See id. Moshman notes that "[i]n terms of the model Commons and
Rodriguez present, for example, most adolescents are capable of formal
operational reasoning and most adults rarely reason beyond that level."
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However, if an adult functioning below the minimally normal
level witnessed a randomly selected graduation prayer and
perceived, even with instruction or disclaimer to the contrary,
school endorsement of religion, then it still would be constitu-
tionally impermissible for that adult to attend the ceremony.
This would be true even though other adults who were capable
of discerning neutrality would be allowed to attend. Thus,
Moshman is also a develocrat, a position that few people, if any,
would find acceptable.'79 The solution to develocracy is not to
discriminate among attendees but to avoid sending messages
that violate the Constitution.
4. Conclusions from Psychological Research
Individuals develop the framework necessary to perceive
and to integrate complex social phenomena in distinct, progres-
sive and observable stages. 80  Based on reliable data,181 so-
cial perspective-taking theorists maintain that only a small
minority of developmentally advanced individuals can discern
without instruction the source of an establishment of reli-
gion.'82 With training, minimally mature individuals could
perceive school endorsement of religion unless the graduation
prayer were offered under neutral circumstances." s Further-
more, even with establishment-spotting instruction, adults and
adolescents functioning at stages below that of a minimally
normal adult, and all children, would perceive a prayer offered
at a public school's graduation exercise to be an endorsement of
Reply, supra note 128, at 345. Because most adolescents have minimal normal
adult reasoning competence, differentiating between them and adults is
inappropriate from a developmental perspective. Id. Commons and Rodriguez
are in greater danger of endorsing develocracy, because they postulate adult
stages of development and do not contend that constitutionality should be
based on a "minimally normal adult." Sonnert, supra note 175, at 433-35.
... See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2682 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Many graduating seniors, of course, are old enough to vote. Why
then, does the Court treat them as though they were first-graders? Will we
soon have a jurisprudence that distinguishes between mature and immature
adults?").
... See supra notes 122-143 and accompanying text.
..1 See supra part II.B.
182 See supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
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prayer by that school."M Because the great majority of indi-
viduals would perceive an establishment of religion within the
context even of an "ideal"'185 public school commencement
prayer, a school that allowed such a prayer would do so in
violation of the Establishment Clause.
III. A DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF
GRADUATION PRAYER
This section discusses the unconstitutionality of prayers
offered at public school commencement ceremonies and explains
the actions schools can take to make the prayers less constitu-
tionally objectionable. However, although some individuals
perceive the difference between student and school endorsement
of religion at these ceremonies, most do not. Therefore, only a
misguided court would permit such prayers.'86
A. GRADUATION PRAYERS VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
The offering of a student-directed prayer at a public school
commencement ceremony would appear to most participants to
endorse religion and thus violates the First Amendment.'87
Commons and Rodriguez contend that the developmental stage
necessary to distinguish voluntary from State-established prayer
is higher than the stage reached by the minimally normal
adult. ' Because only the rare graduation attendee would
discern the distinction between the sources of the prayer,
89
courts should rule public high school commencement prayers
unconstitutional.
"88 See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
185 See infra part III.B.
'8 See, e.g., Moshman, supra note 176, at 30 ("One might need to limit [the
child's First Amendment rights] in a public school, for example, if... children
engaged in activities that created the impression that the school had endorsed
a particular religion .... ); CHILDREN, supra note 127, at 181 ("Many attempts
to get more religion into public schools are, to be sure, intended to get the
school to endorse, encourage, or facilitate religion. Such efforts should be
scrupulously resisted. It is important to avoid even the perception of govern-
ment support for religion.").
" See supra notes 153-164 and accompanying text.
188 Id.
.89Supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court followed that course in Lee v.
Weisman;9 ° indeed, the direct State involvement with the
prayer in that case should have made it an easy decision.' 9'
In Jones II the school was allowed to turn over to students the
responsibility for choosing the prayer. 192  However, as the
Harris court found, graduations are a school function. 93
Therefore, most participants would nonetheless perceive the
prayer to be an endorsement of religion by the school. Because
of this perception, the public school graduation prayer violates
the Establishment Clause.
B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH GRADUATION PRAYERS,
IF PERMITTED, WOULD BE LEAST OBJECTIONABLE
The precautions discussed below show to what unlikely
lengths those involved would have to go to make public school
graduation prayers less objectionable. Nevertheless, a gradua-
tion prayer that was student-directed, randomly-selected,
school-disclaimed, and offered at a ceremony children could not
attend would not render the prayer constitutionally permissible.'
" See supra part I.C.1.
... See supra part I.B.1.
See supra part I.B.2.
193 See supra part I.B.3. See also Paulsen, supra note 31, at 838 n.155:
But where government delegates governmental decision-making
power to otherwise private individuals (as it did in Jones), or takes
action designed to enlist private actors to carry out the
government's ends (which would be unconstitutional if carried out
directly by government), such subterfuges should not deprive the
action of the quality of state action.
194 But see, Schweitzer, supra note 11, at 183-85 (discussing attempts to
offer such "prayers" and for a discussion of a "constitutional model" for
graduation prayer); Dina F. El-Sayed, Comment, What is the Court Trying to
Establish? An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 21 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 441,
473-76. This section does not discuss the oxymoronic "neutral" or "non-sectari-
an" prayer. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992) ("The sugges-
tion that government may establish an official or civic religion as a means of
avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds strikes us as
a contradiction that cannot be accepted." ); see also id. at 2667 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (noting the Establishment Clause "forbids not only state practices
that 'aid one religion.., or prefer one religion over another,' but also those
that 'aid all religions.") (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947)). But cf Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (declining to parse
prayers that do not "proselytize or advance any one or [I disparage any other
faith or belief.")
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1. Graduation Prayers Must Be Student-Directed
Courts should require the prayers to be as removed from
school endorsement as possible. For those who perceive the
difference between student-directed, as opposed to school-estab-
lished religious activity, courts should ensure that the prayer is
in fact a voluntary student establishment. The arrangement
made in Jones II by Clear Creek Independent School District
satisfies this requirement to the extent that students decide
whether there will be a prayer, who will offer it, and what it
will contain.'95 One problem with this method, as observed in
Harris, is that the school district retains ultimate control.'96
Another problem, also criticized by Harris... and discussed
below, is that majority vote should not decide whether, who, or
what the solemnization will be.
One difficulty with delegating the prayer selection process
to students is that supervision might be required to ensure a
fair selection process. 9 ' Such monitoring implicates the entan-
glement prong of the Lemon test'99 and therefore potential
violation of the Establishment Clause. °0
2. The Prayers, if Offered, Must be Randomly
Selected
As suggested by the illustration of the principal at
metasystematic level 5b, the nature of the prayer and who offers
it should be decided by random selection.20" Each student
195 See supra part I.B.2.
See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
'9' See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
198 Cf, e.g., Reply, supra note 128, at 342 ("in a school with an oppressive,
coercive, or indoctrinative atmosphere, even 'voluntary' religious groups
[prayer selection] may result in religious inculcation.") (citing Commons &
Rodriguez, supra note 128); see also Commons and Rodriguez, supra note 128,
at 324-25.
199 See supra text accompanying note 27.
0 See Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D.




1 See supra text accompanying note 151; see also Jager v. Douglas County
Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 827 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989)
(ruling unconstitutional the offering of invocations prior to football games):
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could offer the solemnization proposal of his choice, thereby
providing each student a chance to have his views heard. °2
This means that the majority preference would usually have its
way, but it also would mean that a minority voice might some-
times be heard. This would provide the majority an opportunity
to practice a tolerance typically reserved for minorities.0 3
The problem with this system, besides the possibility of
"joke" proposals or pressures that could be brought to bear on
those submitting proposals, is that a random selection that
resulted in the selection of a minority prayer could spur the
organizers to decide that solemnization was unimportant that
year. They might cancel the prayer altogether, try for a re-
selection, or otherwise attempt to subvert the process. 204 Not-
Under the terms of the equal access plan, all school clubs and
organizations can designate club members to give invocations, and
any student, parent or school staff member can seek to deliver an
invocation. The plan specifies that the student government will
randomly select the invocation speaker, and no ministers will be
involved in selecting invocation speakers or in delivering invoca-
tions. In addition, the schools will not monitor the content of the
invocations.
Id. (emphasis added).A "well-defined program for ensuring on a rotating basis
that persons representative of a wide range of beliefs and ethical systems are
invited to participate" was suggested by the court in Albright v. Board of
Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682, 691 (D. Utah 1991).
202 As discussed at supra note 167 and accompanying text, any choice for
solemnization would have to include non-religious alternatives and be conduct-
ed in a free-communication social context. Commons & Rodriguez, supra note
128, at 325-36.
13 See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2686 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
The founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of sectari-
an religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife. And
they also knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to
foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration-no, an
affection--for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer togeth-
er, to the God whom they all worship and seek.
Presumably, a shared solemnization about what stirs any member, majority or
minority, will promote these positive feelings. But see supra note 72.
204 For an explanation, see Rybash & Roodin, supra note 127, at 222:
[w]hile both formal and postformal thinkers may be trying to arrive
at the best [prayer] alternative, they nevertheless view their task in
different ways. Formal thinkers know that only a single viewpoint
... is "true," while the other viewpoints ... must be "false."
Postformal thinkers understand that despite the fact that only one
[prayer] may [be spoken], all of the viewpoints possess a certain
degree of legitimacy and utility.
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withstanding these precautions, a lottery selection would be the
least constitutionally objectionable prayer selection system.
3. Such Prayers, if Allowed, Must be Disclaimed
Justice Scalia suggested that an announcement be made or
a program note be included concerning the prayer. °5 Howev-
er, the Harris court deemed the disclaimer in that case to be
bordering on the disingenuous.0 6
Nevertheless, on the theory that every little bit helps, a
written or verbal explanation of the selection process would be
appropriate, along with a disavowal by the school of any en-
dorsement of the religion or type of prayer selected.0 ' One
difficulty with a disclaimer is that the person who needs it the
most might be the person least likely to understand it; for
example, a child.
4. Children May Not Attend Commencements Having Prayers
The Supreme Court has in various Establishment Clause
cases noted the different levels of impressionability characteris-
tic of collegians, secondary school students, and elementary
school students.0 8 If the Court ruled it constitutional for
adults and adolescents to be confronted with an apparent
2o5 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (see supra
text accompanying note 86).
2
1 See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 1994 WL 651111, *9
(9th Cir. 1994); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1981) (finding
disclaimer on the Ten Commandments posted on classroom walls did not to
change the religious nature of that document); Timothy L. Hall, Sacred
Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the Establishment Clause, 79
IOWA L. REV. 35, (1993):
A government disclaimer cannot so reailily neutralize the establish-
ment danger in civic prayer. When government invites civic prayer,
it creates a spiritual community within a civic context. Even if
government tries to distance itself from the actual content of a
prayer, it still invites spiritual participation in a civic setting.
Id. at 93. But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (noting
disclaimer with approval in allowing college Christian group to use university
facilities); SEN. REP. No. 357, supra note 67, at 2382 (finding that
"misperceptions can be met by clear disclaimers of school sponsorship.").
207 "T[Adolescents ... can usually grasp and apply a brief explanation."
Moshman, Equal Access, supra note 128, at 191.
20 See supra part I.
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establishment of religion, the Court should still distinguish such
persons from children, who clearly lack the capacity to discern
school from student endorsement. The Court should not allow
individuals lacking the developmental apparatus of even mini-
mally normal adults, especially children younger than twelve
years of age,2 °9 to attend a public school commencement that
includes prayer.210 One problem with this restriction is that
it may exclude family and friends from the commencement. It
also requires monitoring.
More palatable practically, but more egregiously violative of
the Establishment Clause, would be to require that children be
accompanied by an adult.21' Although a child would not under-
stand an accompanying adult's explanation of the prayer's
possible non-endorsement nature, at least the adult would be
able to help the child respond to the prayer in an appropriate
fashion. The best alternative, however, is to exclude the prayer
in the first place.
C. SUMMARY OF APPLICATION OF THE RESEARCH TO THE LAW
According to social perspective-taking research, most adults
cannot discern that a completely student-facilitated public
school commencement prayer is not a school endorsement of
religion. In order to permit graduation prayer, the prayer would
have to be student directed, chosen by lottery selection, and
presented with disclaimers to an audience in which there were
no children present. Even with such restrictions, this least
constitutionally objectionable prayer still would violate the First
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The first part of this Note provided the legal background of
the public school graduation prayer debate and focused on the
assumptions courts made about the abilities of students and
others to perceive whether and how a school establishes reli-
gion. Part II set forth theories and findings of developmental
209 See Moshman, supra note 176.
210 See CHILDREN, supra note 127, at 117-18.
211 Cf. Griffith v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054, 1057, ruled erroneous in 807
F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 1992) (noting that "[adults' presence] may be expected
to mitigate any 'coercive power' that might otherwise be present.").
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psychology that defined and described individuals' progressive
stages of perceiving and processing complex social phenomena,
in this case, the establishment of religion. Part III contained
developmentally-informed solutions to the legal dilemma posed
and found that even with onerous restrictions the least objec-
tionable offering of the prayer would violate the Constitution.
The issue of prayer in public school commencement ceremo-
nies engenders significant emotion and prejudice and demands
careful judicial attention. Rather than resolve such an impor-
tant issue "on the basis of myths, stereotypes, and vague per-
sonal memories, often without distinguishing matters of empiri-
cal fact from ... normative ideals,""'2 psychological and other
social scientific research should be used to foster informed
judicial decision-making. In order for the courts to resolve
properly the public school graduation prayer dilemma, it is
essential for them to understand its empirical dimensions and
to rule accordingly. Otherwise, their decisions are just so many
banners flapping in the wind.
Ted W. Harrison
t
21 2Moshman, Equal Access, supra note 127, at 196. (citing Gary B. Melton,
The Clashing of Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST, 345-354 (1987)).
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